Kaplan’s thesis is “Europe defined the 20th century; the Indian Ocean will define the 21st.” He makes an interesting and largely compelling argument.
My first note is that Kaplan is not an armchair journalist who lives in a library. He draws from personal experience traveling through the countries in the greater Indian ocean he outlines. His experiences range from sitting down with radical political leaders in countries of the middle east or crossing the disputed borderlands between Thailand and Burma (Myanmar) on a rainy jungle night.
Second, Kaplan brings an even-handed approach to the discussion. I didn’t detect the kind of overt political tones that emerge from the pages of the New York times or the Wallstreet journal’s editorial section. Kaplan seems to have his own ideas and defends them eloquently. Except for an odd preference for Obama era foreign policy, his political allegiances don’t overly taint the narrative.
The crux of the argument is China is a rapidly rising world power with capabilities that may soon rival the U.S. The Indian ocean, India in particular, is the bridge between the U.S. and China. Illustratively, Kaplan’s argument centers on the power of maps to change how we think about a situation; it’s a thought reminiscent of Nicholas Carr’s The Shallows where he argues that maps, clocks, books, and now the internet, have drastically changed our world schemas. Kaplan suggests that the most familiar map centered on the Atlantic, with The US on the left and Europe on the right, is no longer the proper paradigm for the theater of geopolitics in the 21st century.
Essentially, Kaplan argues that as this geography becomes more important economically and militarily (due to rise of China and India) The U.S.A will need to craft relationships and alliances in the area to control those economic and military factors. There are several complicating factors that make this new global arena strategically different from that of the world wars and the Cold War.
As he examines the many failed democracies of the region, Kaplan observes “democracy that cannot control its own population may be worse for human rights than a dictatorship that can.” This reminds me of the state of the French republic when Napoleon seized power and of Chile when Pinochet seized power. Kaplan specifically points out that Qaboos bin Said of Oman did a better job protecting his citizens’ human rights than most of the surrounding democracies. As Mosiah suggests “If it were possible that you could have just men to be your kings… then it would be expedient that ye should always have kings to rule over you.”
Another important note is encapsulated in this quote: “Historically, both Marxist and liberal intellectuals, in their efforts to remake societies after Soviet and Western models, have tragically underestimated these traditional loyal ties existing below the level of the state.” Much of Kaplan’s time is spent describing the mismatch between nations and states in the region. For example, the Kurdish people living between Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran; the Burmese hill tribes living on the border of Myanmar and Thailand; and the Tamils of Sri Lanka. These are closely related to national divisions within states such as The Muslim Hindu division in India. This mismatch between cultural and constitutional nationalism is another cause of dynamic instability in the region.
(monsoon conclusion)
Overall, this book is interesting, thorough, and reasonably engaging. My main reservations are 1. I don’t feel qualified to say how rigorous the strategic conclusions are. 2. It’s so niche that most readers may have a hard time connecting. Still, if you’re looking for a book to spark geopolitical conversation, this is a winner.